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Abstract
Artificial intelligence (AI) has been successfully applied in numerous scientific domains including biomedicine and healthcare.
Here, it has led to several breakthroughs ranging from clinical decision support systems, image analysis to whole genome
sequencing. However, training an AI model on sensitive data raises also concerns about the privacy of individual participants.
Adversary AIs, for example, can abuse even summary statistics of a study to determine the presence or absence of an individual
in a given dataset. This has resulted in increasing restrictions to access biomedical data, which in turn is detrimental for
collaborative research and impedes scientific progress. Hence there has been an explosive growth in efforts to harness the power
of AI for learning from sensitive data while protecting patients’ privacy. This paper provides a structured overview of recent
advances in privacy-preserving AI techniques in biomedicine. It places the most important state-of-the-art approaches within a
unified taxonomy, and discusses their strengths, limitations, and open problems.
Introduction
AI strives to emulate human intelligence and to develop in-
telligent algorithms that undertake complicated tasks. For
many complex tasks, AI already surpasses humans in terms
of accuracy, speed and cost. Recently, the rapid adoption
of AI and its subfields, specifically machine learning and
deep learning, has led to substantial progress in applications
such as autonomous driving [1], text translation [2] and voice
assistance [3]. At the same time, AI is becoming essential in
biomedicine, where it has increasingly captured the attention
of researchers. In particular, the rise of big data in healthcare
makes it necessary to develop techniques that help scientists
to gain understanding from it [4].
Success stories such as acquiring the compressed rep-
resentation of drug-like molecules [5], modeling the hier-
archical structure and function of a cell [6] and translating
magnetic resonance images to computed tomography [7]
using deep learning models illustrate the remarkable perfor-
mance of these AI approaches. AI has not only achieved
remarkable success in analyzing biomedicine data [8–18],
but also has surpassed humans in applications such as sep-
sis prediction [19], malignancy detection on mammography
[20] and mitosis detection in breast cancer [21].
Despite these AI-fueled advancements, important pri-
vacy concerns have been raised regarding the individuals
who contribute to the training datasets. While taking care of
the confidentiality and privacy of sensitive biological data is
crucial, several studies showed that AI techniques often do
not maintain data privacy [22–24]. In general, attacks known
as membership inference can be used to infer an individual’s
membership by querying over the dataset [25] or the trained
model [22], or by having access to certain statistics about
the dataset [26–28]. Homer et al. [26] showed that under
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some assumptions, adversaries can use the genomic statistics
published as the results of genome-wide association studies
(GWAS) to find out if an individual was a part of the study.
Another example of this kind of attack was demonstrated by
attacks on Genomics Beacons [25, 29], in which an adver-
sary (an attacker who attempts to invade data privacy) could
identify the presence of an individual in the dataset by simply
querying the presence of a particular allele. Moreover, the
attacker could identify the relatives of those individuals and
obtain sensitive disease information [28]. Besides targeting
the training dataset, an adversary may attack a fully-trained
AI model to extract individual-level membership by training
an adversarial inference model that learns the behaviour of
the target model [22].
As a result of the aforementioned studies, health research
centers such as the National Institutes of Health (NIH) as
well as hospitals have restricted access to the pseudonymized
data [30–32]. Furthermore, data privacy laws such as those
enforced by the Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act (HIPAA), and the Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act (FERPA) in the US as well as the EU Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) restrict the use of
sensitive data [33, 34]. Consequently, everyone who needs
access to these datasets has to go through a difficult approval
process, which significantly impedes collaborative research.
Therefore, both industry and academia urgently need to apply
privacy-preserving techniques to respect individual privacy
and comply with these laws.
This paper provides a systematic overview over various
recently proposed privacy-preserving AI techniques, which
facilitate the collaboration between health research institutes
while ensuring data privacy. Several efforts exist to tackle the
privacy concerns in the biomedical domain, some of which
have been examined in a couple of surveys [35–37]. Aziz
et al. [35] investigated previous studies which employed dif-
ferential privacy and cryptographic techniques for human
genomic data. Kaissis et al.[37] briefly reviewed federated
learning, differential privacy and cryptographic techniques
applied in medical imaging. Xu et al. [36] surveyed the gen-
eral solutions to challenges in federated learning including
communication efficiency, optimization, as well as privacy
and discussed possible applications for federated learning
including a few examples in healthcare. Our review dif-
fers from previous works in several aspects. Compared to
[35] and [37], this paper covers a broader set of privacy
preserving techniques including federated learning and hy-
brid approaches but also a wider range of problems such
as privacy-preserving medical image segmentation and elec-
tronic health record classification. In contrast to [36] that
only surveyed federated learning and hybrid approaches, this
paper discusses cryptographic techniques and differential
privacy approaches and their applications in healthcare too.
Moreover, it covers a wider range of studies which employed
four different privacy-preserving techniques for healthcare
applications and compares the approaches using different
criteria such as privacy, accuracy and efficiency.
The presented approaches in this review, are divided into
four categories, namely, cryptographic techniques, differen-
tial privacy, federated learning, and hybrid approaches. First,
we describe how cryptographic techniques — in particular,
homomorphic encryption (HE) and secure multiparty compu-
tation (SMPC) — ensure secrecy of sensitive data by carrying
out computations on encrypted biological data. Next, we
illustrate the differential privacy approach and its capability
in quantifying individuals’ privacy in published summary
statistics of, for instance, GWAS data and deep learning mod-
els trained on clinical data. Then, we elaborate on federated
learning, which allows health institutes to train AIs locally
and to share only selected parameters without sensitive data
with a coordinator, who aggregates them and builds a global
model. Following that, we discuss the hybrid approaches
which enhance data privacy by combining multiple privacy-
preserving techniques. We elaborate on the strengths and
drawbacks of each approach as well as its applications in
biomedicine and healthcare. Next, we provide a compari-
son among the approaches from different perspectives such
as computational and communication efficiency, accuracy,
and privacy. Afterwards, we discuss the most realistic ap-
proaches from practical viewpoint and provide a list of open
problems and challenges to the adoption of these techniques
in real-world healthcare applications.
Cryptographic Techniques
In the healthcare domain and GWAS in particular, cryp-
tograohic techniques have been used to collaboratively com-
pute result statistics while preserving the data privacy [38–
48]. These cryptographic approaches are based on HE [49]
or SMPC [50]. HE enables the computation of addition and
multiplication over encrypted data.
Figure 1: Homomorphic encryption: The participants en-
crypt the private data and share it to a computing party, which
computes the aggregated (and encrypted) results over the en-
crypted data from the participants.
HE-based approaches share three steps (Figure 1):
1. Participants (e.g. hospitals or medical centers) encrypt
their private data and send the encrypted data to a
computing party.
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2. The computing party calculates the statistics over the
encrypted data and shares the statistics (which are
encrypted) with the participants.
3. The participants access the results by decrypting them.
In SMPC, there are multiple participants as well as a
couple of computing parties which perform computations on
secret shares from the participants. Given M participants and
N computing parties, SMPC-based approaches follow three
steps (Figure 2):
1. Each participant sends a separate and different secret
to each of the N computing parties.
2. Each computing party computes the intermediate re-
sults on the M secret shares from the participants and
shares the intermediate results with the other N− 1
computing parties.
3. Each computing party aggregates the intermediate re-
sults from all computing parties including itself to
calculate the final (global) results. In the end, the final
results computed by all computing parties are the same
and can be shared by the participants.
Figure 2: Secure multi-party computation: Each partici-
pant shares a separate, different secret with each computing
party. The computing parties calculate the intermediate re-
sults, secretly share them with each other, and aggregate all
intermediate results to obtain the final results.
To clarify the concepts of secret sharing [51] and multi-
party computation, consider a scenario [52] with two partici-
pants P1 and P2 and two computing parties C1 and C2. P1 and
P2 possess the private data X and Y , respectively. The aim
is to compute X +Y , where neither P1 nor P2 reveals its data
to the computing parties. To this end, P1 and P2 generate
random numbers RX and RY , respectively; P1 reveals RX to
C1 and (X −RX ) to C2; likewise, P2 shares RY with C1 and
(Y −RY ) with C2; RX , RY , (X−RX ) and (Y −RY ) are secret
shares. C1 computes (RX +RY ) and sends it to C2 and C2
calculates (X −RX )+ (Y −RY ) and reveals it to C1. Both
C1 and C2 sum the result they computed and the result each
obtained from the other computing party. The sum is in fact
(X +Y ), which can be shared with P1 and P2.
It is worth mentioning that to preserve data privacy, the
computing parties C1 and C2 must be non-colluding. That
is, C1 must not send RX and RY to C2 and C2 must not share
(X −RX ) and (Y −RY ) with C1. Otherwise, the computing
parties can compute X and Y , revealing the participants’ data.
In general, in a SMPC with N computing parties, data privacy
is protected as long as at most N−1 computing parties col-
lude with each other. The larger N, the stronger the privacy
but the higher the communication overhead and processing
time.
Several studies use HE to develop secure, privacy-aware
algorithms for healthcare data. Kim et al. [41] and Lu et al.
[43] implemented a secure χ2 test for GWAS data using HE.
Lauter et al. [42] developed privacy-preserving versions of
common statistical tests in in GWAS, such as Pearson good
of fit test, tests for linkage disequilibrium, and the Cochran
Armitage trend test. Kim et al. [53] and Morshed et al. [54]
presented a secure logistic for GWAS and linear regression
algorithm for healthcare data, based on HE.
Other studies mainly capitalized on SMPC to implement
different privacy-preserving algorithms applicable to health-
care data. Zhang et al. [47], Constable et al. [46], and Kamm
et al. [45] developed a secure χ2 test based on SMPC for
GWAS data. Shi et al. [55] developed a secure logistic re-
gression algorithm using SMPC. Bloom [56] implemented a
secure linear regression test based on SMPC for GWAS data.
Cho et al. [38] introduced a SMPC based framework to facil-
itate quality control and population stratification correction
for large-scale GWAS and showed that their framework is
scalable to one million individuals and half million single
nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs).
Despite the promises of privacy-preserving algorithms
leveraging cryptographic techniques (Table 1), the road for
the wide adoption of these algorithms in the biomedicine and
healthcare community is long [57]. The major limitations
of HE are few supported operations and computational over-
head [58]. HE supports only addition and multiplication
operations, and as a result, developing complex AI mod-
els with non-linear operations such as deep neural networks
(DNNs) using HE is very challenging. Moreover, HE incurs
remarkable computational overhead since it performs oper-
ations on encrypted data. The main constraints of SMPC
are computational overhead and network bottleneck [59].
Similar to HE, SMPC suffers from high overhead which
comes from operating on secret shares from a large number
of participants or large amount of data. Additionally, SMPC
consumes high network bandwidth because participants need
to send a large number of secret shares to the computing par-
ties, which in turn, send the intermediate results to the other
parties. Unlike HE, SMPC is flexible in terms of operations.
On the other hand, HE is more communication-efficient com-
pared to SMPC. Both HE and SMPC based algorithms are
not scalable due to their computational overhead, which hin-
ders their adoption for large-scale biomedical and healthcare
data [57].
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Table 1: Literature for cryptographic techniques in biomedicine. HE: homomorphic encryption, SMPC: secure multiparty
computation
Authors Year Privacy Technique Model Application
Kim et al. [41] 2015 HE
χ2 statistics
minor allele frequency
Hamming Distance
Edit distance
genetic associations
DNA comparison
Lu et al. [43] 2015 HE χ
2 statistics
D′ measure genetic associations
Lauter et al. [42] 2014 HE
D′ and r2 measures
Pearson goodness-of-fit
expectation maximization
Cochran-Armitage
genetic associations
Kim et al. [53] 2018 HE logistic regression medical decision making
Morshed et al. [54] 2018 HE linear regression medical decision making
Kamm et al. [45] 2013 SMPC χ2 statistics genetic associations
Constable et al. [46]
Zhang et al. [47]
2015
2015 SMPC
χ2 statistics
minor allele frequency genetic associations
Shi et al. [55] 2016 SMPC logistic regression genetic associations
Bloom [56] 2019 SMPC linear regression genetic associations
Cho et al. [38] 2018 SMPC
quality control
population stratification genetic associations
Differential Privacy
One of the state-of-the-art concepts for eliminating and quan-
tifying the chance of information leakage that has gained con-
siderable attention in recent years is differential privacy [60–
66]. Differential privacy [67–69] is a mathematical model
that encapsulates the idea of injecting enough randomness
or noise to sensitive data. So, even a strong adversary with
arbitrary auxiliary information about the data will still be
uncertain in identifying any of the individuals in the dataset.
It’s primary goal is to camouflage the contribution of every
single individual by inserting uncertainty into the learning
process. It has become standard in data protection and has
been effectively deployed by Google [70] and Apple [71] as
well as agencies such as the United States Census Bureau.
Furthermore, it has drawn the attention of researchers in
privacy-sensitive fields such as biomedicine and healthcare
[66, 72–86].
Differential privacy ensures that the model we train does
not overfit the sensitive data of a particular user. In particular,
the model trained on a dataset containing information of a
specific individual should be statistically indistinguishable
from a model trained without the individual (Figure 3). As
an example, assume that a patient would like to give consent
to his/her doctor to include his/her personal health record
in a medical dataset to study the coordination between age
and Cardiovascular disease. Differential privacy provides
a mathematical guarantee which captures the privacy risk
associated with the patient’s participation in the study and
explains to what extent the analyst or the potential adversary
can learn about a particular individual in the dataset.
More formally, a randomized algorithm (an algorithm
that has randomness in its logic and its output can vary even
on a fixed input) A : Dn −→ Y is (ε , δ )-differentially private if
for all subsets y⊆ Y and for all adjacent datasets D,D′ ∈ Dn
that differ in at most one record the following inequality
holds:
Pr[A(D) ∈ y]≤ eεPr[A(D′) ∈ y]+δ
Here, ε and δ are privacy loss parameters where lower
values imply stronger privacy guarantees. δ is an exceed-
ingly small value (e.g. 10−5) indicating the probability of an
uncontrolled breach, where the algorithm produces a specific
output only in the presence of a specific individual and not
otherwise. ε represents the worst case privacy breach in the
absence of any such rare breach. If you assume δ = 0, you
will have a pure (ε)-differentially private algorithm, while if
you consider δ > 0 to approximate the case in which pure
differential privacy is broken, you will have an approximate
(ε , δ )-differentially private algorithm.
Two important properties of differential privacy are com-
posability [87] and resilience to post-processing. Compos-
ability means that combining multiple differentially private
algorithms yields another differentially private algorithm.
More precisely, if you combine k (ε , δ )-differentially pri-
vate algorithms, the composed algorithm is at least (kε , kδ )-
differentially private. Differential privacy also assures re-
sistance to post-processing theorem which states passing
the output of an (ε , δ )-differentially private algorithm to
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any arbitrary randomized algorithm will still uphold the (ε ,
δ )-differential privacy guarantee.
Figure 3: Differential privacy; The model trained on a
dataset including a specific individual and the one trained on
the same dataset excluding that individual, looks statistically
indistinguishable to the adversary.
The community efforts to ensure the privacy of sensitive
biomedicine data using differential privacy can be grouped
into four categories according to the problem they address
(Table 2):
1. Approaches to query genomics databases [66, 85, 86].
2. Statistical and AI modeling techniques in biomedicine
[78–83].
3. Data release, i.e., releasing summary statistics such as
p-values and χ2 contingency tables [73–75, 84].
4. Training privacy-preserving generative models [63, 88,
89].
Studies in the first category proposed solutions to re-
duce the privacy risks of genomics databases such as GWAS
databases and genomics beacon service [90]. The Beacon
Network [29] is an online web service developed by the
Global Alliance for Genomics and Health (GA4GH) through
which the users can query the data provided by owners or re-
search institutes, ask about the presence of a genetic variant
in the database, and get a YES/NO as response. Studies have
shown that an attacker can detect membership in the Beacon
or GWAS by querying these databases multiple times and
asking different questions [25, 91, 92]. In a recent work,
Aziz et al. [86] proposed two lightweight algorithms to
make the Beacon’s response inaccurate by controlling a bias
variable. These algorithms decide when to answer the query
correctly/incorrectly according to specific conditions in the
bias variable so that it gets harder for the attacker to suc-
ceed. In another work, Johnson et al. [66] developed a
differentially private query answering framework. With this
framework the analysts can explore the GWAS data without
any prior knowledge of the number and location of SNPs
in the DNA sequence. The analysts can retrieve statistical
properties such as the correlation between SNPs and get an
almost accurate answer while the GWAS dataset is protected
against privacy risks.
Some of the efforts in the second category addressed
the privacy concerns in GWAS data analysis by introducing
differentially private logistic regression to identify associa-
tions between SNPs and diseases [81] or associations among
multiple SNPs [79]. Honkela et al. [80] improve drug sensi-
tivity prediction by effectively employing differential privacy
for Bayesian linear regression. Moreover, Simmons et al.
[83] presented a differentially private EIGENSTRAT (PrivS-
TRAT) [93] and linear mixed model (PrivLMM) [94] while
correcting for population stratification. In another work, Sim-
mons et al. [82] tackled the problem of finding significant
SNPs by modeling it as an optimization problem. Solving
this problem provides a differentially private estimate of the
neighbor distance for all SNPs, such that high scoring SNPs
can be found.
The third category focused on releasing summary statis-
tics such as p-values, χ2 contingency tables, and minor
allele frequencies in a differentially private fashion. The
common approach in these works is to add Laplacian
noise to the true value of the statistics, so that sharing
the perturbed statistics preserves privacy of the individu-
als. They vary in the sensitivity of the algorithms (that
is, the maximum change on the output of an algorithm in
presence or absence of a specific data point) and hence
require different amounts of injected noise [73, 74, 84].
Figure 4: Differentially private deep generative models:
The sensitive data holder (e.g. health institutes) train a dif-
ferentially private generative model locally and share just
the trained data generator with the outside world (e.g. re-
searchers). The shared data generator can then be used to
produce artificial data with the same characteristics as the
sensitive data.
The forth category proposed novel privacy-protecting
methods to generate synthetic healthcare data leveraging
differentially private generative models (Figure 4). Deep
generative models, such as generative adversarial networks
(GANs), can be trained on sensitive biomedical data to cap-
ture its properties and generate artificial data with similar
characteristics as the original data.
Abay et al. [88] presented a differentially private deep
generative model, DP-SYN, a generative autoencoder that
splits the input data into multiple partitions, then learns and
simulates the representation of each partition while maintain-
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Table 2: Literature for differentially private (DP) techniques in biomedicine
Authors Year Model Application
Aziz et al. [86] 2017
eliminating random positions
biased random response querying genomics database
Johnson et al. [66] 2013
distance-score mechanism
p-value and χ2 statistics querying genomics database
Han et al. [81]
Yu et al. [79]
2019
2014 logistic regression genetic associations
Honkela et al. [80] 2018 bayesian linear regression drug sensitivity prediction
Simmons et al. [83] 2016
EIGENSTRAT
linear mixed model genetic associations
Simmons et al. [82] 2016 nearest neighbor optimization genetic associations
Fienberg et al. [73]
Uhlerop et al. [74]
Yu et al. [75]
Wang et al. [84]
2011
2013
2014
2014
statistics such as p-value,
χ2 and contingency table genetic associations
Abay et al. [88] 2018 deep autoencoder generating artificial medical data
Beaulieu et al. [63] 2019 GAN simulating SPRINT trial
Jordon et al. [89] 2018 GAN generating artificial medical data
ing the privacy of input data. They assessed the performance
of DP-SYN on sensitive datasets of breast cancer and dia-
betes. Beaulieu et al. [63] trained an auxiliary classifier GAN
(AC-GAN) in a differentially private manner to simulate the
participants of the SPRINT trial (Systolic Blood Pressure
Trial), so that the clinical data can be shared while respect-
ing participants’ privacy. In another approach, Jordon et al.
[89] introduced a differentially private GAN, PATE-GAN,
and evaluated the quality of synthetic data on Meta-Analysis
Global Group in Chronic Heart Failure (MAGGIC) and the
United Network for Organ Transplantation (UNOS) datasets.
Despite the aforementioned achievements in adopting
differential privacy in the field, several challenges remain to
be addressed. Although differential privacy involves less net-
work communication, memory usage and time complexity
compared to cryptographic techniques, it still struggles with
giving highly accurate results within a reasonable privacy
budget, namely, intended ε and δ , on large scale datasets
such as genomics datasets [35, 95]. In more details, since
the genomics datasets are huge, the sensitivity of the applied
algorithms on these datasets is large. Hence, the amount of
distortion required for anonymization increases significantly,
sometimes to the extent that the results will not be meaning-
ful anymore [96]. Therefore, to make differential privacy
more practical in the field, balancing a trade off between pri-
vacy and utility demands more attention than it has received
[76–78, 84].
Federated Learning
Federated learning [97] is a type of distributed learning
where multiple clients (e.g. hospitals) collaboratively learn
a model under the coordination of a central server while
preserving the privacy of their data [98], [99]. Instead of
sharing its private data with the server or the other clients,
each client extracts knowledge (that is, model parameters)
from its data and transfers it to the server for aggregation
(Figure 5).
Figure 5: Federated Learning: Each participant downloads
the global model from the server, computes the local model
given its private data and the global model, and finally sends
its local model to the server for aggregation and for updating
the global model.
Federated learning is an iterative process in which each
iteration consists of the following steps [99]:
1. The server chooses a set of clients to participate in the
current iteration of the model.
2. The selected clients obtain the current model from the
server.
3. Each selected client computes the local parameters
using the current model and its private data (e.g., runs
6
gradient descent algorithm initialized by the current
model on its local data to obtain the local gradient
updates).
4. The server collects the local parameters from the se-
lected clients and aggregates them to update the cur-
rent model.
The data of the clients can be considered as a table, where
rows represent samples (e.g., individuals) and columns rep-
resent features or labels (e.g., age, blood pressure, case vs.
control). We refer to the set of samples, features, and labels
of the data as sample space, feature space, and label space,
respectively. Federated learning can be categorized into three
types based on the distribution characteristics of the clients’
data:
• Horizontal (sample-based) federated learning
[100]: Data from different clients shares similar fea-
ture space but is very different in sample space. As an
example, consider two hospitals in two different cities
which collected similar information such as age or sex.
In this case, the feature spaces are similar; but because
the people who participated in the hospitals’ data col-
lections are from different cities, their intersection is
most probably very small, and the sample spaces are
hence very different.
• Vertical (feature-based) federated learning [100] :
Clients’ data is similar in sample space but very dif-
ferent in feature space. For example, two hospitals
with different expertise in the same city might collect
different information (different feature space) from
almost the same people (similar sample space).
• Hybrid federated learning: Both feature space and
sample space are different in the data from the clients.
For example, consider a medical center with expertise
in brain image analysis located in New York and a re-
search center with expertise in protein research based
in Berlin. Their data is completely different (image
vs. protein data) and disjoint groups of individuals
participated in the data collection of each center.
To illustrate the concept of federated learning, consider
a scenario with two hospitals A and B. A and B possess lists
X and Y , containing the age of their cancer patients, respec-
tively. A simple federated mean algorithm to compute the
average age of cancer patients in both hospitals without re-
vealing the real values of X and Y works as follows: For the
sake of brevity, we assume that both hospitals are selected in
the first step and that the current global model parameters in
the second step are zero (see federated learning steps).
• Hospital A computes the average age (MX ) and number
of its cancer patients (NX ). Hospital B does the same,
resulting in MY , NY . Here, X and Y are private data
while MX , NX , MY , NY are the parameters extracted
from the private data.
• The server obtains the values of local model parame-
ters from the hospitals and computes the global mean
as follows:
MG =
MX ×NX +MY ×NY
NX +NY
Two well-known concepts in machine learning are also
related to federated learning: transfer learning [101] and
multi-task learning [102, 103]. In transfer learning, there
are source and destination tasks. The aim is to transfer the
knowledge from the source to the destination task. As an
example of federated transfer learning, suppose that hospital
A has a DNN model trained on its rich dataset of medical
images (source task). On the other hand, the hospital B wants
to train a DNN model on a dataset containing brain images
(a special kind of medical images) of its cancer patients (des-
tination task) but the dataset does not have enough samples.
Hospital B can take advantage of hospital A’s DNN model
by incorporating some parts of the source model into its
own DNN model (knowledge transfer) instead of training
the model from scratch on its dataset [104].
In multi-task learning, there are multiple tasks and the
goal is to exchange the knowledge among the tasks to im-
prove the performance (accuracy) of all tasks. As an example
of federated multi-task learning, assume hospitals A and B
again, where hospital A has a task of training a DNN model
on its cancer image dataset and hospital B’s task is to train a
logistic regression model on a dataset including the age, sex,
and genetic variants of its cancer patients. Here, both DNN
and logistic regression models are trained concurrently (and
iteratively) and the knowledge (weights) from both models
are exchanged in each iteration to improve (tune the weights)
both models.
A crucial consideration in both transfer and multi-task
learning is task relatedness. Employing unrelated tasks
can lead to transferring negative knowledge and deteriorat-
ing the performance of the model(s). To learn more about
transfer/multi-task learning, interested readers are referred
to [101–103, 116]. Moreover, federated transfer/multi-task
learning can be a horizontal or hybrid federated learning
approach. In the example provided for federated transfer
learning, if the shape of the images in the source and des-
tination tasks (feature space) are the same, it is considered
as a horizontal approach. Otherwise, it is a hybrid federated
learning approach similar to the example given for federated
multi-task learning.
The emerging demand for federated learning gave rise
to a wealth of both simulation [117, 118] and production-
oriented [119, 120] open source frameworks. Additionally,
there are AI platforms whose goal is to apply federated
learning in real-world healthcare settings [121, 122]. In
the following, we survey works on federated AI techniques
in biomedicine and healthcare (Table 3). The recent stud-
ies in this regard mainly focused on horizontal federated
learning and there are a few vertical federated learning and
federated transfer/multi-task learning algorithms applicable
to healthcare and biomedical data.
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Table 3: Summary of federated learning (FL) approaches in healthcare and biomedicine
Authors Year Model Application
Sheller et al. [105] 2018 DNN medical image segmentation
Chang et al. [106]
Balachandar et al. [107]
2018
2020
single weight transfer
cyclical weight transfer medical image classification
Nasirigerdeh et al. [108] 2020 linear regression, chi-square, logistic regression GWAS
Wu et al. [109]
Wang et al. [110]
Li et al. [111]
2012
2013
2016
logistic regression GWAS
Brisimi et al. [112] 2018 support vector machine classifying electrical health records
Huang et al. [113] 2018 adaptive boosting ensemble classifying medical data
Liu et al. [114] 2018 autonomous deep learning classifying medical data
Chen et al. [115] 2019 transfer learning training wearable healthcare devices
A number of the studies provided solutions for the lack
of sufficient data due to the the privacy challenges in the
medical imaging domain [105–107, 123–125]. For instance,
Sheller et al. developed a supervised DNN in a federated way
for semantic segmentation of brain Gliomas from magnetic
resonance imaging scans [105]. Chang et al. [106] simulated
a distributed DNN in which multiple participants collabora-
tively update model weights using training heuristics such as
single weight transfer and cyclical weight transfer (CWT).
They evaluated this distributed model using image classifica-
tion tasks on medical image datasets such as mammography
and retinal fundus image collections, which were evenly dis-
tributed among the participants. Balachandar et al. [107]
optimized CWT for cases where the datasets are unevenly
distributed across participants. They assessed their optimiza-
tion methods on simulated diabetic retinopathy detection and
chest radiograph classification.
Federated linear/logistic regression or chi-square test
have been developed for sensitive biological data that is
vertically or horizontally distributed [108–111]. The grid
binary logistic regression (GLORE) [109] and the expec-
tation propagation logistic regression (EXPLORER) [110]
are horizontal federated learning approaches designed for
clinical data. Unlike GLORE, EXPLORER supports asyn-
chronous communication and online learning functionality
so that the system can continue collaborating in case a par-
ticipant is absent or if communication is interrupted. Li et
al. presented VERTIGO [111], a vertical grid logistic regres-
sion algorithm designed for vertically distributed biological
datasets such as breast cancer genome and myocardial infarc-
tion data. Nasirigerdeh et al. [108] developed a horizontally
federated tool set for GWAS, called sPLINK, which supports
chi-square test, linear regression, and logistic regression. No-
tably, federated results from sPLINK on distributed datasets
are the same as those from aggregated analysis conducted
with PLINK [126]. Moreover, they showed that sPLINK
is robust against heterogeneous (imbalanced) data distribu-
tions across clients and does not lose its accuracy in such
scenarios.
Moreover, there are studies in the literature that combine
federated learning with other traditional AI modeling tech-
niques such as ensemble learning, support vector machines
(SVMs) and principle component analysis (PCA) [112–115,
127]. Brisimi et al. [112] presented a federated soft-margin
support vector machine (sSVM) for distributed electronic
health records. Huang et al. [113] introduced LoAdaBoost,
a federated adaptive boosting method for learning medical
data such as intensive care unit data from distinct hospitals
[128] while Liu et al. [114] trained a federated autonomous
deep learner to this end. There have also been a couple of
attempts at incorporating federated learning into multi-task
learning and transfer learning in general [129–131]. How-
ever, to the best of our knowledge, FedHealth [115] is the
only federated transfer learning framework specifically de-
signed for healthcare applications. It enables users to train
personalized models for their wearable healthcare devices
by aggregating the data from different organizations without
compromising privacy.
One of the major challenges for adopting federated learn-
ing in large scale healthcare applications is the significant
network communication overhead, especially for complex
AI models such as DNNs that contain millions of model pa-
rameters and require thousands of iterations to converge. A
rich body of literature exists to tackle this challenge, known
as communication-efficient federated learning. These ap-
proaches can be categorized into three categories: gradient
quantification [132], gradient sparsification [133], and more
local updates in clients than global model update [134].
The main idea behind gradient quantification is to use
less bytes for each model parameter (gradient), e.g., 2 bytes
instead of 8. In gradient sparsification, instead of sending
all parameters, a fraction, e.g. 10%, of parameters is ex-
changed between the server and clients, saving 90% network
bandwidth. In the last category of communication-efficient
approaches, the clients update their local parameters multiple
times before sending them to the server to reduce the number
of total iterations, and as a result, decrease the total network
bandwidth usage.
There is a trade-off between communication effi-
ciency and model convergence (accuracy). Employing
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Table 4: Summary of the hybrid privacy-preserving approaches in healthcare and biomedicine
Authors Year Privacy Technique Model Application
Li et al. [135] 2019 FL+DP DNN medical image segmentation
Li et al. [136] 2020 FL+DP domain adoption medical image pattern recognition
Choudhury et al. [137] 2019 FL+DP
perceptron neural network
support vector machine
logistic regression
classifying electronic health records
Constable et al. [46] 2015 FL+SMPC
statistical analysis
(e.g. χ2 statistics) genetic associations
Lee et al. [138] 2018 FL+HE context-specific hashing learning patient similarity
Kim et al. [139] 2019 FL+DP+HE logistic regression classifying medical data
communication-efficient approaches reduces the network
overhead but might jeopardize the model convergence. Con-
sequently, one should keep in mind that communication-
efficient approaches should be leveraged as long as they keep
the accuracy of the model acceptable. Interested readers
are referred to relevant publications [134, 140] for detailed
descriptions.
Another challenge in federated learning is the possible
accuracy loss from the aggregation process if the data distri-
bution across the clients is not independent and identically
distributed (IID). More specifically, federated learning can
deal with non-IID data while preserving the model accuracy
if the learning model is simple such as ordinary least squares
(OLS) linear regression (sPLINK [108]). However, when
it comes to learning complex models such as DNNs, the
global model might not converge on non-IID data across the
clients. Zhao et al. [141] showed that simple averaging of the
model parameters in the server significantly diminishes the
accuracy of a convolutional neural network model in highly
skewed non-IID settings. To solve this problem, they train
a warm-up model on an IID dataset and share the model as
well as a portion of the dataset with all clients. Each client
uses its local data and the shared dataset to train the local
model and the simple averaging is employed in the server to
aggregate the model parameters. Developing the aggregation
strategies which are robust against non-IID scenarios is still
an open and interesting problem in federated learning.
Finally, federated learning is based on the assumption
that the centralized server is honest and not compromised,
which is not necessarily the case in real applications. To
relax this assumption, differential privacy or cryptographic
techniques can be leveraged in federated learning, which is
covered in the next section. For further reading on future di-
rections of federated learning in general, we refer the reader
to comprehensive surveys [99, 142, 143].
Hybrid Privacy-preserving Techniques
The hybrid techniques combine federated learning with the
other paradigms (cryptographic techniques and differential
privacy) to enhance privacy or provide privacy guarantees
(Table 4). Federated learning preserves privacy to some
extent because it does not require the health institutes to
share the patients’ data with the central server. However,
the model parameters that participants share with the server
might be abused to reveal the underlying private data if the
coordinator is compromised [144]. To handle this issue, the
participants can leverage differential privacy and add noise
to the model parameters before sending them to the server
(FL+DP) [135, 136, 145, 146] or they employ HE (FL+HE)
or SMPC (FL+SMPC) to securely share the parameters with
the server [46, 138].
In the biomedical field, several hybrid approaches have
been presented recently. Li et al. [135] presented a federated
deep learning framework for magnetic resonance brain image
segmentation in which the client side provides differential
privacy guarantees on selecting and sharing the local gradient
weights with the server for imbalanced data. A recent study
[136] extracted neural patterns from brain functional mag-
netic resonance images by developing a privacy-preserving
pipeline that analyzes image data of patients having differ-
ent psychiatric disorders using federated domain adaption
methods. Choudhury et al. [137] developed a federated dif-
ferential privacy mechanism for gradient-based classification
on electronic health records. There are also some studies that
incorporate federate learning with cryptographic techniques.
For instance, Constable et al. [46] implemented a privacy-
protecting structure for federated statistical analysis such
as χ2 statistics on GWAS while maintaining privacy using
SMPC. In a slightly different approach, Lee et al. [138] pre-
sented a privacy-preserving platform for learning patient sim-
ilarity in multiple hospitals using a context-specific hashing
approach which employs homomorphic encryption to limit
the privacy leakage. Moreover, Kim et al. [139] presented
a privacy-preserving federated logistic regression algorithm
for horizontally distributed diabetes and intensive care unit
datasets. In this approach, the logistic regression ensures
privacy by making the aggregated weights differentially pri-
vate and encrypting the local weights using homomorphic
encryption.
Incorporating HE, SMPC, and differential privacy into
federated learning brings about enhanced privacy but it com-
bines the limitations of the approaches, too. FL+HE puts
much more computational overhead on the server, since
9
Table 5: Comparison among the privacy-preserving techniques including homomorphic encryption (HE), secure multiparty
computation (SMPC), federated learning (FL), differential privacy (DP) and the hybrid approaches (FL+DP, FL+HE and
FL+SMPC); The generic ranking (lowest =1 to highest = 6) is used for comparison purposes such that having a higher score for
a criteria, represents performing better on that metric.
HE SMPC DP FL FL+DP FL+HE FL+SMPC
Accuracy 2 6 1 5 3 4 5
Computational efficiency 1 2 6 6 5 3 4
Network communication efficiency 5 4 6 3 3 2 1
Privacy of exchanged traffic 4 3 NA 1 2 4 3
Exchanging low sensitive traffic 7 7 NA 3 3 3 3
Privacy guarantee 7 7 3 7 3 7 7
it requires to perform aggregation on the encrypted model
parameters from the clients. The network communication
overhead is exacerbated in FL+SMPC, because clients need
to securely share the model parameters with multiple comput-
ing parties instead of one. FL+DP might result in inaccurate
models because of adding noise to the model parameters in
the clients.
Comparison
We compare the privacy-preserving techniques (HE, SMPC,
differential privacy, federated learning, and the hybrid ap-
proaches) using various performance and privacy criteria
such as computational/communication efficiency, accuracy,
privacy guarantee, exchanging sensitive traffic through net-
work and privacy of exchanged traffic (Table 5 and Figure
6). We employ a generic ranking (lowest =1 to highest = 6
) [35] for all comparison criteria except for privacy guaran-
tee and exchanging sensitive traffic through network, which
are binary criteria. This comparison is made under the as-
sumption of applying a complex model (e.g. DNN with a
huge number of model parameters) on the large sensitive
biomedical datatsets distributed across dozens of clients in
IID configuration. Additionally, there are a few computing
parties in SMPC (practical configuration).
Computational efficiency is an indicator of the extra com-
putational overhead an approach incurs to preserve the pri-
vacy. According to Table 5 and Figure 6, differential privacy
and federated learning are the best from this perspective.
This is because the noise injection procedure in differential
privacy is not computationally expensive and federated learn-
ing follows the paradigm of bringing computation to data,
distributing computational overhead among the clients. HE
and SMPC are based on the paradigm of moving data to
computation. In HE, encryption of the whole private data in
the clients and carrying out computation on encrypted data
by the computing party cause a huge amount of overhead.
In SMPC, a couple of computing parties process the secret
shares from dozens of clients, incurring considerable com-
putational overhead. Among the hybrid approaches, FL+DP
has the best computational efficiency given the lower over-
head of the two approaches whereas FL+HE has the highest
overhead because aggregation process on encrypted parame-
ters is computationally expensive.
Network communication efficiency indicates how ef-
ficient an approach utilizes the network bandwidth. The
less data traffic is exchanged in the network, the more
communication-efficient the approach is. Federated learn-
ing is the least efficient approach from the communication
aspect since exchanging a large number of model parameter
values between the clients and the server generates a huge
amount of network traffic. Notice that network bandwidth
usage of federated learning is independent of the clients’ data
because federated learning does not move data to computa-
tion but depends on the model complexity (i.e. the number
of model parameters). The next approach in this regard is
SMPC, where not only each participant sends a large traffic
(almost as big as its data) to each computing party but also
each computing party exchanges intermediate results (which
might be large) with the other computing parties through the
network. The network overhead of homomorphic encryption
comes from sharing the encrypted data of the clients (as big
as the data itself) with the computing party, which is small
compared to network traffic generated by federated learning
and SMPC. The best approach is differential privacy with
no network overhead. Accordingly, FL+DP and FL+SMPC
are the best and worst among the hybrid approaches from
communication efficiency viewpoint, respectively.
Accuracy of the model in a privacy-preserving approach
is a crucial factor in whether to adopt the approach. SMPC
and federated learning are the most accurate approaches in-
curring no or a little bit accuracy loss in the final model. The
next is homomorphic encryption whose accuracy loss is due
to approximating the non-linear operations using addition
and multiplication (e.g. least squares approximation [53]).
The worst approach is differential privacy where the added
noise can considerably affect the model accuracy. In the
hybrid approaches, FL+SMPC is the best and FL+DP is the
worst considering the accuracy of SMPC and differential
privacy approaches.
The rest of the comparison measures are privacy-related.
The traffic transferred from the clients (participants) to the
server (computing parties) is highly sensitive if it carries
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Figure 6: Comparison radar plots for all (a) and each of (b-h) the privacy preserving approaches including homomorphic en-
cryption (HE), Secure multiparty computation (SMPC), differential privacy (DP), federated learning (FL) and hybrid techniques
(FL+DP, FL+HE and FL+SMPC)
the private data of the clients. The less sensitive the ex-
changed traffic is, the more robust the approach is from the
privacy perspective. HE and SMPC send the encrypted and
anonymous form of the clients’ private data to the server, re-
spectively. Federated learning and hybrid approaches share
only the model parameters with the server. In HE, if the
server has the key to decrypt the traffic from the clients, the
whole private data of the clients will be revealed. The same
holds if the computing parties in SMPC collude with each
other. This might or might not be the case for the other
approaches (e.g. federated learning) depending on the ex-
changed model parameters and whether they can be abused
to infer the underlying private data.
Privacy of the exchanged traffic indicates how much the
traffic is kept private from the server. In HE/SMPC, the data
is encrypted/anonymized first and then shared with the server,
which is reasonable since it is the clients’ private data. In
federated learning, the traffic (model parameters) is directly
shared with the server assuming that it does not reveal any
details regarding individual samples in the data. The aim of
the hybrid approaches is to hide the real values of the model
parameters from the server to minimize the possibility of
inference attacks using the model parameters. FL+HE is the
best among the hybrid approaches from this viewpoint.
Privacy guarantee is a metric which quantifies the degree
to which the privacy of the clients’ data can be preserved.
Differential privacy and the corresponding hybrid approach
(FL+DP) are the only approaches providing a privacy guar-
antee, whereas all other approaches can only protect the
privacy under a set of certain assumptions. HE assumes that
the server does not have the decryption key; The underlying
assumption in SMPC is that the computing parties do not
collude with each other; federated learning supposes that the
model parameters do not give any detail about a sample in
the clients’ data.
Discussion and open problems
From a practical point of view, homomorphic encryption
and SMPC that follow the paradigm of ”move data to com-
putation” do not scale as the number of clients or data size
in clients become large. This is because they put the com-
putational burden on a single or a few computing parties.
Federated learning, on the other hand, distributes the com-
putation across the clients (aggregation on the server is not
computationally heavy) but the communication overhead
between the server and clients is the major challenge to scal-
ability of federated learning. The hybrid approaches inherit
this issue and it is exacerbated in FL+SMPC. Combining
homomorphic encryption with federated learning (FL+HE)
adds another obstacle (computational overhead) to scalability
of federated learning. There is a growing body of literature
on communication-efficient approaches to federated learn-
ing, which we already discussed. These approaches can
dramatically improve the scalability of federated learning
and make it suitable for large-scale applications including
those in biomedicine.
Given that federated learning is the most realistic ap-
proach from a scalability viewpoint, it can be used as a
standalone approach as long as inferring the clients’ data
from the model parameters is practically impossible. Other-
wise, it should be combined with differential privacy to avoid
possible inference attacks and exposure of clients’ private
data and to provide privacy guarantee. The accuracy of the
model will be satisfactory in federated learning but it might
be deteriorated in FL+DP. A realistic trade-off needs to be
considered depending on the application of interest.
Moreover, differential privacy can have many practical
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applications in biomedicince as a standalone approach. It
works very well for low-sensitivity queries such as count-
ing queries (e.g number of patients with a specific disease)
on biomedical databases and its generalizations (e.g. his-
tograms) since the presence or absence of an individual
changes the query’s response by at most one. Moreover,
it can be employed to release summary statistics such as χ2
and p-values in a differentially private manner while keeping
the accuracy acceptable. A novel promising research direc-
tion is to incorporate differential privacy in deep generative
models to generate synthetic biomedical data.
Future studies can investigate how to reach a compro-
mise between scalability, privacy, and accuracy in real-world
settings. The communication overhead of federated learn-
ing is still an open and interesting problem since although
state-of-the-art approaches considerably reduce the network
overhead, they adversely affect the accuracy of the model.
Hence, novel approaches are required to preserve the ac-
curacy, which is of great importance in biomedicine appli-
cations, while making federated learning communication-
efficient.
Adopting federated learning in non-IID settings, where
biomedical datasets across different hospitals/medical cen-
ters are heterogeneous, is another important challenge to
address. This is because typical aggregation procedures such
as simple averaging do not work well for these settings, yield-
ing inaccurate models. Hence, new aggregation procedures
are required to tackle non-IID scenarios. Moreover, current
communication-efficient approaches which were developed
for an IID setting might not be applicable to heterogeneous
scenarios. Consequently, new techniques are needed to re-
duce network overhead in these settings, while keeping the
model accuracy satisfactory.
Combining differential privacy with federated learning
to enhance privacy and to provide a privacy guarantee is
still a challenging issue in the field. It becomes even more
challenging for healthcare applications, where accuracy of
the model is of crucial importance. Moreover, the concept
of privacy guarantee in differential privacy has been defined
for local settings. In distributed scenarios, a dataset might be
employed multiple times to train different models with vari-
ous privacy budgets. Therefore, a new formulation of privacy
guarantee should be proposed for distributed settings.
Conclusion
The advent of AI in biomedicine has brought about indis-
pensable progress in the field and is expected to result in even
more impressive advances in the future [147]. For AI tech-
niques to succeed, big biomedical or healthcare data needs
to be available and accessible. However, the more AI models
are trained on sensitive biological data, the more pressing pri-
vacy concerns become, which, in turn, necessitate strategies
for shielding the data [148]. Hence, privacy-enhancing tech-
niques are crucial to allow AI to benefit from the sensitive
biological data.
Cryptographic techniques, differential privacy and fed-
erated learning can be considered as the prime strategies
for protecting personal data privacy. Broadly, these emerg-
ing techniques are based on either securing sensitive data,
perturbing it or not moving it off site. In particular, cryp-
tographic techniques securely share the data with a single
(HE) or multiple computing parties (SMPC), differential pri-
vacy adds noise to sensitive data and quantifies privacy loss
accordingly, while federated learning enables collaborative
learning under orchestration of a centralized server without
moving the private data outside local environments.
All of these techniques have their own strengths and lim-
itations. HE and SMPC are more communication efficient
compared to federated learning but they are computation-
ally expensive since they move data to computation and put
the computational burden on a server or a few computing
parties. Federated learning, on the other hand, distributes
computation across the clients but suffers from high network
communication overhead. Differential privacy is an efficient
approach from a computational and a communication per-
spective but it introduces accuracy loss by adding noise to
data or model parameters. Hybrid approaches are studied to
combine the advantages or to overcome the disadvantages
and limitations of the individual techniques. We argued that
federated learning as a standalone approach or in combina-
tion with differential privacy is the most realistic approach to
be adopted in healthcare applications. We discussed the open
problems and challenges in this regard including the balance
of communication efficiency and model accuracy in non-IID
settings, and need for a new notion of privacy guarantee for
distributed biomedical datasets.
Incorporating privacy into the analysis of biomedical and
healthcare data is still an open challenge, yet preliminary
accomplishments are promising to bring practical privacy
even closer to real-world healthcare settings. Future research
should investigate how to make a trade-off between scalabil-
ity, privacy, and accuracy in real healthcare settings.
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